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Abstract
Design process models have a complex and changing relationship to the processes they model, and mean different things 
to different people in different situations. Participants in design processes need to understand each other’s perspectives and 
agree on what the models mean. The paper draws on philosophy of science to argue that understanding a design process 
model can be seen as an imagination game governed by agreed rules, to envisage what would be true about the world if 
the model were correct. The rules depend on the syntax and content of the model, on the task the model is used for, and on 
what the users see the model as being. The paper outlines twelve alternative conceptualizations of design process models—
frames, pathways, positions, proclamations, projections, predictions, propositions, prophecies, requests, demands, proposals, 
promises—and discusses when they fit situations that stakeholders in design processes can be in. Articulating how process 
models are conceptualised can both help to understand how process management works and help to resolve communication 
problems in industrial practice.
Keywords Engineering design · Design process models · Process management · Philosophy of technology · Make-believe 
theory
1  Introduction: process models direct 
actions
What is a design process model telling you to do? What is 
it telling you to expect? What is it telling you about how to 
reach agreement with your colleagues? What does it mean, 
in this context?
Designers and design managers talk about processes 
and processes models all the time without being aware that 
both the terms and the intentions behind process models 
are ambiguous. Managers often complain that processes do 
not get followed or that designers do not carry out tasks 
or activities in the right way, the right order or at the right 
time. Designers on the other hand complain about processes 
being too abstract or that processes are difficult to apply to 
their day-to-day activities, are missing important aspects, 
or do not depict the reality that they experience (Eckert and 
Stacey 2010). This points to a lack of shared understanding 
about what processes are and what process models tell them. 
Many factors can contribute to this lack of shared under-
standing, like different expertise, perspectives, priorities 
or time horizons. However, this paper focuses on the roles 
models and how people understand them can play in these 
divergent interpretations of what to do, as process models 
are manifestation of processes that are shared—often with-
out explanation—amongst groups.
Models of design processes can be created for many dif-
ferent purposes. But the intended purpose is only part of 
the story; models are frequently repurposed, and they can 
be interpreted as having different meanings by different 
people. The relationship between a model and its target is 
extrinsic to the model—something not always appreciated 
by the people who use them—and it can shift during the 
course of designing without the model itself changing. Our 
work is motivated by wanting to understand how plans and 
process models can function to coordinate and manage dif-
ferent groups and individuals in complex processes when 
their relationship to what is actually done is often fluid and 
unreliable, and people understand them in different ways, 
as well as understand how the coordination can go wrong. 
This paper aims to elucidate the richness of potential ways to 
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think about process models (and other, less structured infor-
mation about processes) in terms of the range of different 
roles they play in guiding activities. These roles correspond 
to different ways of conceptualising what process models 
are; we put forward a set of twelve alternative conceptualiza-
tions that might be appropriate in different situations. Con-
sidering these roles gives researchers a theoretical frame-
work for looking at the coordination of design processes, 
and working engineers a set of ideas for making sense of 
and resolving conflicts.
Engineering companies put considerable effort into 
developing processes both in terms of high-level process 
models, such as gateway processes, and in terms of pro-
cess plans for specific projects to plan, manage, control and 
record processes (Browning and Ramasesh 2007). These 
are represented in a variety of different ways from informal 
hand-drawn sketches of models to formal models generated 
according to specific modelling conventions, often in spe-
cific modelling tools. Processes and their models used in 
industry can be both formal and informal. High-level pre-
scriptive processes and carefully generated process plans 
do play an important role, but are only part of the picture 
(Eckert and Clarkson 2010).
Academic research on design process models has largely 
focused on prescriptive models from the point of view of 
how a process should be carried out (see Wynn and Clark-
son 2017 for a review) or on the development of tools and 
methods to generate process plans (Browning and Ramasesh 
2007; Karniel and Reich 2011). By contrast, this paper 
focuses on design processes as seen from the point of view 
of people in industry, who create models and act based on 
process models. This paper builds on an empirical case study 
conducted in an automotive company, where we interviewed 
18 engineering managers and engineers about how they plan 
their processes (Eckert and Clarkson 2010) and other empiri-
cal studies of process planning (Flanagan 2006) and process 
modelling (Wynn 2007) that the second author participated 
in.
This is a theoretical paper which provides a framework for 
conceptualising process models to help designers and design 
research to make sense of diverse interpretations of models. 
It builds on two philosophical theories: make-believe theory 
(also known as pretence theory and prop theory) and speech 
act theory. Understanding what models are and what models 
do is central to our enterprise. For this, we draw on recent 
work in philosophy of science (primarily by Toon 2012; and 
Frigg 2010a, b, c) that views scientific models as defining 
games in which we imagine what the world would be like 
if the models were accurate. This in turn draws on Kendall 
Walton’s theory of mimesis as make-believe, according to 
which works of art such as novels and paintings define hypo-
thetical worlds, in conjunction with more general principles 
of interpretation; by playing a game of make-believe, we 
can reason and agree about what is fictionally true in these 
imagined worlds. This paper argues that what people think 
a model implies is true about the design process depends not 
just on the model, but on what they conceive of the model as 
being. To explain the difference in interpretations, we draw 
on speech act theory (Austin 1962; Searle 1969) to argue 
that the appropriate reasoning principles for thinking about 
design processes in particular situations are influenced by 
the attitudes to the models people have and convey to others, 
which depend on what they think of the models as being and 
thus what roles they think the models play in determining 
the design process itself.
Section 2 begins by framing our discussion of how mod-
els of design processes are understood in the context of how 
design process models are used in industry. In Sect. 3, we 
sketch out the huge range of kinds of process models by 
discussing surveys of process model research that have clas-
sified models according to intended purpose and the types 
of activities they are intended for. In Sect. 4, we introduce 
the philosophical idea of rule-governed imagination games, 
in which models act as props; and apply this to design pro-
cess models in Sect. 5. Section 6 explores a variety of ways 
in which participants in design processes can see design 
process models as being different things that have different 
implications for the imagination games they can play with 
them. Section 7 shows how our characterisations of what 
models can be for the people who use them cuts across the 
range of purposes they were intended for. Section 8 draws 
some conclusions for design research and the practice of 
engineering design.
2  Models in design processes
In this paper we are chiefly concerned with what people 
draw from design process models. Frequently, and almost 
always in large-scale engineering, explicit models of pro-
cesses play crucial roles. However, much process-relevant 
information used to plan and manage design processes is 
not systematised in models but comprises assertions of plan 
elements and requirements and constraints that are not com-
posed into a coherent structure. While this paper talks about 
process models, most of what we have to say about how 
models are used also encompasses this less coherent process 
information, though only some of the ways of thinking about 
models we discuss fit unconnected process elements.
The question of whether social processes like product 
development, and social structures like a design team or a 
company have any objective existence, and if so what sort, 
has generated an enormous amount of debate in philosophy 
(see Miller 2011) and the social sciences (notably in the 
seminal contribution of Berger and Luckmann 1966). What 
if people disagree about what the structures and processes 
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are? This is recognised as a key issue for information sys-
tems research on how to support collaborative activities 
(Checkland 1981). For the purpose of our paper, we can skip 
over this while taking a pragmatic middle position: Different 
participants have different and equally legitimate views of 
what the structure and processes are, but treat their beliefs 
as being objective facts about objectively existing structures. 
Where people manage to agree on them well enough to get 
work done together harmoniously, we can treat the intersub-
jectively agreed structures as real as a working approxima-
tion (note that Checkland 1981, strongly disagrees). Mod-
els to some extent reflect the perspectives of the modellers. 
In situations where conflicts of perspective matter the alter-
native views need to be respected.
2.1  Terminology for engineering design processes
The term ‘design process’ is used all the time by people 
who see no need to define it. It has two distinct meanings 
that are sometimes confused: (1) the officially prescribed 
set of steps or stages that product development ought to go 
through, according to a plan or methodology or company 
policy; and (2) the set of activities that are actually carried 
out in the course of developing a plan for an artefact.
In engineering, the sets of activities this covers are often 
referred to as ‘design and development’ processes (DDP), 
or ‘product development’ processes (PD), or ‘new product 
development’ processes (NPD). Browning and Ramasesh 
(2007) point out that “Product development (PD) com-
prises the myriad of multifunctional activities conducted by 
a firm between ‘defining a technological or market oppor-
tunity’ and ‘starting production’ of a unique product or 
service”. These activities make up the design process and 
are expressed in terms of process models, as the processes 
themselves are intangible.
2.2  Interpreting process models as a problem 
in industry
In our previous work, we have observed a lack of a shared 
understanding amongst the participants of design processes. 
Contributing factors included: (a) a plethora of different and 
often overlapping models were used in the same process 
(Eckert and Clarkson 2010); (b) information related to one 
activity was expressed in different ways in multiple models; 
and (c) a lack of common interpretation of process models 
(Eckert and Stacey 2010).
2.2.1  A plethora of co‑existing models
In the automotive company reported in Eckert and Clarkson 
(2010), different people in the organisation used a great vari-
ety of information artefacts as plans (as illustrated in Fig. 1) 
rather than having one coherent master plan. Individuals 
reasoned about multiple models and linked them in their 
minds. For example, the company generated a business case 
to bid for a new project, which included a high-level process 
plan. The project manager used a plan for when particular 
information or results were required by teams outside the 
design process, such as slots on testing rigs or handover of 
information to manufacturing. The individual design teams 
then generated their own plans to deliver their components 
and systems, which were largely driven by the lead times of 
externally sourced components; and the individual design-
ers planned their own activities partly through to-do lists. 
When a crisis arose, a plan, listing and scheduling tasks, 
was created to deal with the firefighting (see also Repenning 
et al. 2001). While the engineers used mainly activity mod-
els or time-based models, their colleagues in such business 
functions as accounting, purchasing and manufacturing used 
product models to guide and monitor the progress of the 
process; for example, this particular process was partly con-
trolled by the number of components in a bill of materials 
that were already signed off.
The business case was developed before the project 
started and not touched again. The company’s high-level 
NPI (new product introduction) process and the Quality 
process were predefined, but the dates for the milestones 
and key activities were adjusted. Lead times were largely 
Fig. 1  Stakeholders (left) and the representations they use for plan-
ning processes (right). Key: Thick solid lines indicate the main mod-
els used by each stakeholder. Thin solid lines indicate additional 
plans considered. Dashed lines and box shadings indicate the dis-
tinction between models in terms of quality plans, process plans and 
product plans. Figure from Eckert and Clarkson (2010)
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set through the needs of the suppliers. Testing tasks were 
set early in the process through the need to book test equip-
ment. The tasks in the major task plan remained roughly the 
same, even though the timings changed. Research plans and 
activity plans were highly dynamic and focused on particular 
parts of the process. The firefighting plans were local and 
ephemeral. The cost estimations and the bill of materials 
were constantly changing as components were finalised and 
then adjusted to keep the target cost relatively constant.
Large organisations sometimes attempt to capture 
detailed prescriptions of processes with detailed descriptions 
of individual steps as part of knowledge capture activities 
(see Bergsjö et al. 2019); however, they find it challenging 
to implement these in practice (Riege 2005).
2.2.2  Different aspects of some activities are captured 
in multiple models
For example, lead time schedules specify the dates when the 
specifications for components or systems need to be handed 
over to the supplier to assure timely delivery of the parts. In 
the case study company, the airbags were major long-lead-
time items. The time was negotiated with the supplier based 
on the preliminary specification in the business case. The 
designers planned their activities and ordered their decision 
to be able to specify the airbag on time. The major task plan 
considers the lead times. Individual designers generate their 
own activity plans around the lead time plan. Firefighting 
will occur if lead times could be missed. The signing off of 
components is monitored in the bill of materials, which is 
used to track the process. The likely component costs are 
incorporated into the cost model and other components need 
to be changed to make them cheaper to meet the overall 
target cost.
2.2.3  Different perspectives on the same model
The perspective on a process is different between those who 
are participants in a process and those who interact with a 
process without helping to carry it out, for example sup-
pliers or test engineers. Inside the process, individuals can 
affect the process on a local level and might even engage in 
defining the process; however, in large organisations they 
might have limited say on the overall processes that they 
are engaged in or the prescriptive processes the organisa-
tion uses. They are allocated tasks with deadlines and have 
to work towards them, even though many managers make a 
huge effort to consult and engage designers in the planning. 
Those outside the process include other groups within the 
organisation, like finance, manufacturing or sales, and out-
side suppliers or consultants interacting with the process. In 
both categories, there are people who need to be concerned 
with how the process operates and those who are interested 
in the results produced by parts of the process.
The interpretation of the models is also different between 
those who generate a process model and those who inter-
pret it. The case study company wanted to avoid everybody 
putting a time buffer on their time estimates, and therefore 
issued a statement that the product did not include inno-
vation and so this process would include no iteration. In 
practice, the vehicle architect had planned in considerable 
buffer into the time of the ‘NPI schedule’ (the company’s 
stage gate plan with timings for the gateways), but had not 
marked this as iteration. While everybody knew that avoid-
ing repetition of steps was unlikely, they kept their buffers 
to a minimum trusting the project buffer that the vehicle 
architect had planned in for resolving problems—what one 
of his colleagues referred to as “emergency innovation” 
(Eckert et al. 2011).
The planning behaviour in the company was highly 
dynamic and complex, and the designers and managers 
needed to cope with a high degree of uncertainty about 
both the product and the process, yet the company deliv-
ers successful products and manages to coordinate a large 
number of individuals to achieve a common goal. This paper 
is partly motivated by our observations of the company’s 
process management.
3  Research on design process modelling
The engineering design and process management commu-
nity has taken a pragmatic approach and largely looked at 
design process from three different angles. One is developing 
generic models that aim to identify general patterns across 
all design process or across some classes of design pro-
cesses. A second approach concentrates on tool development 
and specific ways to model and analyse design processes 
in particular modelling frameworks, which researchers or 
practitioners can apply to modelling design processes, such 
as DSMs (Browning 2001), Petri nets (for instance, Kusiak 
and Yang 1993); Applied Signposting (Wynn et al. 2006; 
Wynn 2007) or OPM (Dori and Reinhartz-Berger 2003; 
see Dori 2002). A third strand investigates the behaviour 
of models developed using one of the model frameworks, 
and the inferences that can be drawn from the models, for 
example simulations of process behaviour in Applied Sign-
posting (Wynn 2007).
3.1  Generic models of processes
Generic process models are generated independently of 
specific projects. In their comprehensive review of design 
process models in engineering, Wynn and Clarkson (2017) 
carried out a comprehensive study of the research literature 
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on design process models and classified them by scope and 
by purpose or type, according to the purpose stated by the 
authors of the papers, see Table 1. They divided the pur-
pose of processes thus: Procedural models are for guiding 
future processes according to best practice. Analytical mod-
els are constructed to understand and convey insights from 
a particular past process. Abstract models convey theories 
and conceptual insights. Management science/operations 
research models are used to develop insights from math-
ematical or computational analysis of specific cases.
According to the level of detail, Wynn and Clarkson 
further divide processes into macro-level, meso-level and 
micro-level models. Micro-level models describe individual 
process steps. Models of particular processes can be very 
specific and concrete. Meso-level models, which are the 
focus of this paper, describe the sequences of tasks and/or 
flow of information through the process; while macro-level 
models focus on the overall structure of the process. Meso-
level models vary in their level of abstraction (see Maier 
2017; Maier et al. 2017). Many generic high level models 
of design that span different industries have been proposed 
(see Wynn and Clarkson 2017, for a comprehensive review), 
as have models of designing in a particular sector such as 
shipbuilding (e.g., Evans 1959). These are necessarily more 
abstract. Many of the models that are problematic in practice 
are procedural and analytical models at a meso-level.
Another dimension on which the models vary is whether 
they are descriptive or prescriptive models, though the 
distinction can be blurred (see Eckert and Stacey 2010). 
Abstract models are frequently used in education and 
research or to provide a vocabulary to think about specific 
processes. The remaining categories largely aim at support-
ing the planning and management of processes. Some of 
the abstract macro-level models are descriptive in that they 
describe common elements of many or all design processes. 
Whereas, procedural models tend to be prescriptive. Ana-
lytical and MS/OR models can be either, as some start with 
the description of current processes from which procedural 
models for future processes can be derived.
3.2  Purposes of models in industry
Browning and Ramasesh (2007) conducted a survey of 200 
research papers and theses on activity-network-based pro-
cess modelling aimed at supporting process management, 
thus focusing on what Wynn and Clarkson (2017) term pro-
cedural models. They classified the purposes of PD process 
models into the following categories:
• Project visualisation to display actions, interactions 
and commitments in a current or previous process, for 
instance using a large process flow map as a focal point 
for group discussion.
• Project planning to identify activities to be done, struc-
ture the process, identify sources of uncertainty and risk, 
allocate resources, and estimate and improve key project 
variable.
• Project control to monitor the state of the project and 
whether commitments to deliver information and interim 
results are being kept, and determine the best direction to 
go and how to dynamically re-plan the project.
• Project development for continuous improvement of 
working practices, organisational learning and knowl-
edge management, and training.
While Browning and Ramasesh analysed research litera-
ture, Eckert and Clarkson (2010) observed that the plans in 
their case study organisation served three distinct purposes:
• Prescriptive plans tell designers what they should do and 
how they should do it, enforcing the order or the timing 
of plans—these plans are specific and forward looking.
• Goal and monitoring plans tell designers what state they 
must reach at what point in the design process.
• Recording plans are used to record what has happened 
during a project—such plans are sometimes adjusted 
retrospectively to capture the actual development of the 
project.
Table 1  Wynn and Clarkson’s organising framework for design process models. It comprises two dimensions, each with several categories. 
Redrawn from Wynn and Clarkson (2017)
Dimension Category Models in this category
Scope Micro-level Focus on individual process steps and their immediate contexts; procedures
Meso-level Focus on end-to-end flows of tasks as the design is progressed
Macro-level Focus on project structures and/or the design process in context
Type Procedural Convey recommendations of best practice
Analytical Provide ways to model specific situations for analysis/improvement/support
Abstract Convey theories and conceptual insights into the design and development process
MS/OR Develop insights by mathematical/computational analysis of representative cases
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The prescriptive plans map closely to Browning and 
Ramasesh’s project planning and the goal and monitoring 
plans to the control function of plans. The recording plans 
could be seen as a special case of project deployment plans; 
however, in the Eckert and Clarkson (2010) case study, the 
same models were frequently used to carry out all three of 
these purposes, while others were updated. Other compa-
nies treat the process model as a “living document”, which 
changes all the time. In this case, the original planned tim-
ings and activities might be lost.
It is worth highlighting the project coordination function 
of process models, where models serve to coordinate the 
work of teams and individual participants within a project, 
across the projects within a company, and across a supply 
chain. In design, one of the well-recognised purposes of 
models is to act as boundary objects (Star and Griesemer 
1989; see for instance Carlile 2002; Subrahmanian et al. 
2003). They serve as channels of communication between 
people who have different knowledge and expertise, different 
ways of thinking about designs and problems, and different 
concerns—what Bucciarelli (1994, 2002) terms different 
object worlds—and can thus draw different inferences from 
them.
Karniel and Reich (2013) see the goal of process model-
ling in “obtaining insight into the process to manage it more 
effectively”. They argue that as uncertainties are resolved 
and the design of the product changes, a process model 
needs to be updated during the process, incorporating the 
additional product knowledge, such as new activities or new 
relations (Karniel and Reich 2011). In Karniel and Reich 
(2007), they differentiate between pre-defined processes 
(P-process), current plan processes (C-process), and run-
time process (RT-process). In Karniel and Reich (2011), 
they refine C-processes and RT-processes into 5 classes of 
dynamic models: iterative models with a constant scheme, 
i.e. where a given task sequence is repeated; models with 
exception handing where another predefined path is followed 
in an iteration; ad hoc models that are changed manually as 
required; dynamic changes to the scheme, where tasks are 
added or removed; and changes to the project logic.
4  Models
Designers and other participants in complicated design 
processes interact with these processes partly through 
models, and the models play significant roles in shaping 
what they do. We are interested in how this works, and 
what people do with their process models, and whether 
this is different in different situations. This requires us to 
look at what models are, and what their relationships are 
to whatever they are models of, and how models enable 
people to make inferences about the targets of the models. 
Such questions have been of great concern to the philoso-
phy of science community (see Frigg and Hartmann 2012 
for an introduction) and more recently also to the phi-
losophy of technology community (for instance, Poznic 
2016a). One problem is that the word ‘model’ is used quite 
loosely in design as it is in the sciences; how to define the 
term and what exactly constitutes a model is a controver-
sial issue in philosophy of science. It is nearly impossible 
to say anything uncontroversial about scientific models; 
the question of what models in design are models of raises 
more complicated issues (Eckert and Hillerbrand 2018), 
and design process models are more slippery still (Eckert 
and Stacey 2010). Nonetheless we need a clear position.
4.1  On what models are
We adopt a pragmatic understanding of representation and 
modelling, seeing use for a purpose as essential to these 
notions: “There is no representation except in the sense that 
some things are used, made, or taken, to represent some 
things as thus or so” (Van Fraasen 2008, 32).
For us, a model is an entity that is employed as a model 
by an agent for a purpose. A model may be a physical object, 
or a program, or a mathematical entity, or a purely concep-
tual structure specified by a description or a diagram, but it 
has structure, properties or behaviour in its own right. To 
employ an entity as a model is to assert that a correspond-
ence of some sort exists between the structure, properties 
or behaviour of the model and that of the target, and use 
this correspondence to make inferences about the structure, 
properties or behaviour of the target.
Scientific models range from material objects such as 
Watson and Crick’s ball and stick physical model of DNA, 
to numerical models used in computer simulations like the 
atmospheric models used for weather forecasting, to sets 
of mathematical equations like those describing the (quan-
tum) harmonic oscillator to model the hydrogen atom. Note 
that for most philosophers, the equations or the diagrams 
are not the model—they describe the model (Giere 1988; 
Bailer-Jones 2009; Frigg 2010a, b, c). For instance, Bohr’s 
model of the atom, describing the movements of the elec-
trons around the nucleus as similar to planets around the sun, 
is an abstract conceptual structure, which can be described 
verbally, be drawn on paper, or illustrated in a 3D physical 
model. However, some (notably Toon 2010a, b, 2012) con-
tend that model descriptions are about the targets and that 
models are not distinct from model descriptions.
There is, however, a consensus that models are ordinarily 
abstractions of some kind. They can be conscious idealiza-
tions or simplifications, or make assumptions contradicting 
accepted knowledge (cf. Chakravartty 2010). For the pur-
pose of this paper, we treat a model as an abstraction of 
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reality by an agent for a certain purpose: features of the tar-
get are disregarded in the mapping or included only as sym-
bols standing for complex characteristics, in the expectation, 
or hope, either that the excluded features are unimportant for 
the current purpose or that the influence of the characteris-
tics included in the model can be understood in isolation.
4.2  On the relationships between models and their 
targets
Though there is no consensus on the exact role of models 
in science, for many philosophers of science it is central 
that models represent certain aspects of reality, their target 
systems. Models represent their targets when they stand for 
them, depict them or denote them. This depends on shared 
understanding of modelling conventions that enable us to 
interpret this use. The representation relationship is com-
plex and is debated by philosophers (for a survey see Frigg 
and Nguyen 2016). Following the account of Morrison and 
Morgan (1999), models serve to mediate the relationship 
between theories and the specific phenomena they account 
for and the results in particular experimental setups they 
explain.
In science, the targets of models typically are natural phe-
nomena. The relation between the model and its target is, 
however, even more problematic in design, as the models 
bring the target into being and only have a loose relation to 
the product or process that emerges (see Eckert and Hiller-
brand 2018). What the target of a design process model is, is 
a tricky issue, in that while the model is an abstraction of the 
messy business of designing that enables people to reason 
about how designing is organised, the model also helps to 
shape the process itself.
However, in science models also do not always have 
straightforward targets in the natural world. Models make 
use of false or simplified assumptions; nonetheless they are 
the central building blocks of scientific explanations and 
drive scientific progress. This raises the question for philoso-
phy of science of how can models be used to infer statements 
that can be seen as right or wrong. Recent philosophers of 
science, notably Roman Frigg (2010a, b, c) and Adam Toon 
(2010a, b, 2012), have argued that models in science serve as 
sources of components and rules for games of make-believe 
in which the scientists reason about what the world would 
be like if the models were accurate. They have focused on 
the role of imagination in envisaging the meaning and impli-
cations of scientific models, drawing on Kendall Walton’s 
(1990) theory of make-believe to see how statements about 
conjectured states of affairs described by models can be true 
or false.
While engineering design is a serious business—lives and 
livelihoods depend on it—the idea of imagination games 
governed by rules gives us a way to understand what is going 
on in design activities, and in particular, how the different 
participants coordinate what they do. It enables us to think 
about the role of models in designing, and see designing 
and process planning activities as rational activities leading 
to rationally justifiable conclusions, without committing to 
naive or oversimplified views of the relationships between 
models and their targets.
Models of actual and hypothetical artefacts give us ways 
to understand and imagine what the artefact is like, or would 
be like, that are constrained by the models. Our imagination 
is both channelled by the models and can be checked against 
the models. Similarly, models of design processes give us 
ways both to imagine how the design processes will work, 
and make statements about how the design process will work 
according to the model. How can models do this? How can 
we think about how models do this, in ways that will help 
us use them?
4.3  Rule‑governed imagination: games 
of make‑believe
Walton (1990) argued that works of fiction such as novels, 
as well as films and plays and static artworks like figurative 
paintings, define fictional worlds in which statements like 
‘Harry Potter is a wizard’ are fictionally true while state-
ments like ‘Dudley Dursley is a pupil at Hogwarts’ are false. 
According to Walton, the reader or viewer constructs an 
understanding of the depicted situation by envisioning what 
follows from what they are explicitly told. This involves par-
ticipating in an imagination game, just like a child’s game of 
make-believe, where the rules of the game supplied by the 
artwork, plus more general principles of interpretation, make 
some propositions true within the world of the game and 
others false. Walton’s view is open to criticism as a theory of 
how fiction works; for example, New (1999) pointed out that 
Walton neglects the role of illusion—that the viewer knows 
is an illusion but willingly enters into—in the appreciation of 
art or film. However, it gives philosophers of science a way 
to think about how statements based on models but about 
the real world can be true or false—and we can agree on 
them—when it is not obvious as to how the models actually 
represent the real-world target. We argue here that it gives 
us a conceptual lens through which to understand how one 
can make true or false statements about what is the case 
according to a design process model, when what the target 
of the model is is a slippery issue.
In this view, informational entities like stories are props 
that serve to define the rules of imagination games as well as 
playing roles in the games themselves. The term comes from 
the physical objects used in games of make-believe (a card-
board box on the living room carpet serving as a boat); how-
ever, what props are, collectively, is the source of the ground 
fictional facts that are used with more general principles for 
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how to use these sorts of informational entities to form and 
constrain the imagination game by determining what is the 
case in the game (fictional, in Walton’s terminology)—they 
‘mandate’ what the reader is to imagine. Thus the text of 
Harry Potter and the Goblet of Fire is a prop; so too in 
our view representations of design information like a CAD 
model of a turbine blade or a Gantt chart listing designing 
activities are also props.
The notion of authorised game is central to Walton’s 
theory. Authorised games are those with an established 
and socially shared set of rules that can not be arbitrarily 
changed by the participants in the game, i.e., the readers. 
The rules are determined by what the author has written. For 
example, the Harry Potter books are an authorised game, so 
that what is “true” and “false” in the imagination game is 
defined and agreed. Thus a statement S is fictional in a work 
W if the statement is true in the imaginary world defined by 
the work. (Walton did not like the idea of ‘fictional world’ 
preferring to see this just as what follows from the rules of 
the game; statements that are fictional are valid in a work 
W in the sense that they are derivable from it.) This applies 
both for explicitly stated fictional truths, like ‘Draco Malfoy 
is a member of Slytherin House’ and implied fictional truths 
like ‘Harry Potter is a native speaker of English’. Correctly 
inferring implied facts requires background knowledge. It 
helps the reader to understand the culture the work of fiction 
is set in. For example, the structure and agony of exams at 
Hogwarts closely mirror that of British secondary schools.
The players of the game, i.e., the readers, need to buy into 
the game by accepting the props and rules of the game when 
that means suspending some of their usual beliefs about the 
world; and they need to understand the rules sufficiently well 
to make sense of the story.
Walton came at the problem from the perspective of the 
interpretation of works of art or fiction, once they are fin-
ished and published. His focus was on how fictional state-
ments can be true or false despite being obviously false in 
the real world in which Harry Potter does not exist, i.e., 
they are not true simpliciter, so we are not to view them as 
true, but our proper attitude is one of make-belief. Walton 
did not concern himself with the need to change the rules 
of the game depending on an emerging situation, which is 
crucial to the practice of design. Nor did Walton engage with 
how the authors of plays or movie scripts have a different 
perspective from directors and actors, who need to interpret 
and add to an authorised game in order to make it work and 
thereby share in the creation of the game the audience plays. 
We argue here that similar differences in perspective mat-
ter for the different imagination games designers and other 
stakeholders play with design process models.
4.4  Models as props in science
Philosophers of science like Frigg (2010a, b, c) and Toon 
(2010a, b, 2012) have adapted Walton’s theory of make-
believe, to argue that theories and models in science define 
the rules of imagination games in which we can envisage the 
behaviour of the aspect of the natural world the theories and 
models are about, and make objectively correct statements 
about what the world is like according to the model. Cen-
tral concerns for them are to nail down what models are in 
philosophical terms, and what it is for a model to represent 
its target, and see how statements about what would be true 
about the world if the model were correct can be objectively 
true, without needing to claim that the phenomenon that is 
the target of the model exists in any sense, or that the model 
is more than a mental construct. Philosophers are wary of 
the word ‘true’, which comes with two and a half thousand 
years of argument about how to define truth; whether a state-
ment is a valid inference is a more appropriate and useful 
concept. This matches engineers’ conceptions of models and 
inferences from them having ‘validity’ and ‘fidelity’ rather 
than truth.
According to this argument, the models scientists con-
struct and use constitute props that are both used in the game 
and help to define its rules. (In philosophy of science this 
view is called fictionalism. The term fictionalist is unfortu-
nate, as Giere (2009) points out: scientific models and theo-
ries are intended as accurate accounts of the real world and 
are not works of fiction.) The props include the diagrams, 
three-dimensional objects, and so on, that describe the mod-
els that scientists reason with and about. Although Frigg 
and Toon’s accounts differ and are both open to criticism 
(see Poznic 2016b), the approach helps to understand how 
scientists use models. Scientific reasoning connects scien-
tists’ creative thought envisioning the world according to 
the model to the use of rigorous methods to calculate what 
follows from the models and to compare this with observa-
tions of reality. The notion of fictional truth can help us to 
see how the products of imagination can be subject to rigor-
ous, scientifically and philosophically defensible statements 
about the claims models make and whether they are borne 
out by observations.
5  Engineering process models as props 
in imagination games
We use Walton’s theory of games and make-believe and 
extend it to elucidate how teams of designers doing imagina-
tive work can operate within a shared framework to achieve 
a coherent view.
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5.1  Reasoning with models of hypothetical systems
The individual cognitive processes of making provisional 
design choices and envisioning what follows from them can 
be grounded in an agreed set of facts and requirements, and 
an agreed set of principles for how to interpret models and 
other documents. The principles enable designers to talk and 
agree on what is implied by the models, facts, requirements, 
and so on. (Of course, misunderstandings occur, and design-
ers need to negotiate a shared understanding; see Minneman 
1991; Brereton et al. 1996.) Thinking of design as a game 
of make-believe allows us to treat inferences drawn from 
models that do not have clearly defined target systems in 
the same way as inferences from models that have clearly 
defined, really existing targets. It enables us to look at how 
engineers and managers accept a set of assumptions and 
propositions about a new product, which they combine with 
their knowledge of engineering to reason about the charac-
teristics of hypothetical products.
Seeing design as comprising imagination games in which 
the models or model-descriptions serve as props give us a 
way to see how we can talk about the validity of statements 
about hypothetical systems: a statement is true of the envi-
sioned system if it is implied by the props describing models 
of the system. In the terminology of Waltonian fictionalism, 
such a statement is fictional in the work or game defined by 
the rules (general knowledge about engineering, physics, 
software, etc.) and the props (the diagrams, equations, etc., 
specifying the models).
Understanding what a prop (such as a sketch of a mecha-
nism or a building, or a diagram of a design process) contrib-
utes to the imagination game has two levels: what it means, 
and what can be inferred from it using other knowledge 
(Walton’s direct and indirect ‘principles of generation’). 
Walton and his followers distinguish between ‘primary’ 
fictional truths that follow ‘immediately’ from the props, 
and ‘implied’ fictional truths. Similar distinctions have been 
drawn from studies of designing. For instance Goldschmidt 
(1991), studying architectural sketching, noted an alternation 
between seeing a sketch as being something, and seeing that 
it implied particular consequences.
5.2  Changing the rules of the game
Hypothetical future artefacts are not fixed and are partly 
defined by the models created when designing them (see 
Eckert and Hillerbrand 2018). The requirements the arte-
facts must meet can change during the design process, 
while proposals and provisional design decisions harden 
into commitments; thus what is fixed and what is open to 
discussion in design can shift. In phases where designers 
(of models of artefacts or of process models) generate new 
ideas, the boundaries are fluid between models and other 
representations that function as props that are given (for the 
time being) and those that are inferences about possibilities 
that are conditional on them.
In order for large-scale design projects to succeed, who 
is allowed to do what, and when, needs to be managed and 
coordinated. Both the props and the rules in the imagina-
tion games may change, but, most of the time, these are 
authorised games in the sense that the rules and props are 
determined by someone with the authority to do so, and 
shared and agreed. We can see process models as creating 
an authorised game or contributing to an authorised game, 
as they set rules for the process and the implications of the 
model can be debated by designers, managers and other 
stakeholders who understand the modelling formalism.
Whether we think of an activity defined by one set of 
goals, rules and props as a game, or see a project as one 
game, and decisions making changes to that project as revi-
sions of that game, rather than a new game, is a matter of 
perspective. We can think of design processes as compris-
ing a network of related subgames. What process models 
do is specify—to varying levels of detail—what these sub-
games are. The most appropriate analogies with what are 
commonly thought of as games come from elaborate com-
puter games that include subgames with distinct tasks and 
goals, and opportunities to repeat activities in changed cir-
cumstances. Many design processes have iteration planned 
in—activities are repeated with different parameter values 
or changed assumptions, thus with changed props as well as 
increased knowledge of how to play the game, to converge 
to a workable design. Knowing that there will be iteration 
that is not fully specified can lead to process models being 
seen as vaguer than they actually are. The process models 
themselves change, changing the expected set of subgames. 
Design processes are subject to periodic reviews. Many 
current process paradigms have planned-in updates to the 
process plans. Gateway processes are reviewed at the gates 
and adjustments are made to expected tasks and their timing. 
Agile processes go through planning for each sprint. At this 
point, revised models are released, which can be thought of 
as a new version of the authorised game.
For Walton, authorised games are books or potentially 
other artworks. The activities of designers and managers 
in a product development process are more akin to a play, 
where the original author has provided the original prop, 
but then a new group of actors and directors interpret the 
play and the fictional world it defines and set new principles 
of interpretation and define new props. In a design process, 
as in a play, this elaboration amounting to co-creation is 
essential for realising the original author’s intentions. These 
elaborations are largely, but often not completely consist-
ent with the previous prop. As major decisions are taken 
about the design process and process models are updated, 
a new—derivative—game of make-believe is entered into. 
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As processes frequently change, there can be many of these 
derivative games, taking different parts of the process model 
as given or as open to change and development.
5.3  Process models as props
As explained in Sect. 2, engineering companies generate 
process models to plan, monitor and control design pro-
cesses. At this point, the future process that the models 
describe does not exist, but is shaped by the models. So the 
relationship to their target is complicated.
Participants in the process need to accept them—as 
props—and the principles for interpreting them to coor-
dinate their actions. Designers and managers can imagine 
the implications of process models of varying specificity, 
combining information about the problem and situation with 
information about the model.
Of course, the picture is complicated by the participants’ 
different perspectives on the structure of the organisation, 
interpersonal relationships, the capabilities, needs and pri-
orities of the participants, and so on (c.f. Checkland 1981). 
These might lead different people to have different views 
of the relation between the model and actual or future real-
ity. To put it in Walton’s terms: the different participants’ 
principles of generation are not necessarily shared, and 
may indeed conflict. If a process does not have an objective 
existence, then it is problematic to claim that it is the target 
system of a model with a well-defined mapping between 
them. But a model does not require a target system with 
any particular ontological status to function as a prop; and 
the aim of a prop in reasoning about design processes is not 
to reflect a measurable reality, but to create a shared and 
coherent view.
However, having a workable process plan for a large 
design project involves committing to divisions of labour 
within an implied organisational structure as well as a par-
ticular conceptualization of the tasks. The use of particular 
terms in the process model as well as different methods of 
constructing and diagramming process models has conse-
quences for how the participants conceptualise processes, 
for instance whether the dependencies between activities are 
explicitly imagined in the envisionment of the process and 
stated in the model, left implicit or vague, or disregarded. 
Thus, PERT charts, Gantt charts and sprint plans both make 
different aspects of the structure of the process explicit and 
embody different assumptions about how the process will 
operate.
5.4  Planning as an imagination game
‘How are we going to do this?’ Many process models 
are explicitly generated as plans, and others get used for 
planning purposes and for guiding the performance of the 
process, and so are conceptualised (for these purposes) as 
plans. The models embody decisions made within the pro-
ject for reasons that are apparent to the creator of the model. 
When the time comes to implement the plan, it needs to be 
taken as given in envisioning what needs to be done to pro-
duce particular results by deadlines; before then the plan can 
be changed but according to rules for what the plan needs 
to be like.
Project planning involves a dance between tentatively 
describing the process in a model, envisaging how the pro-
ject would play out according to the model given the plan-
ners’ knowledge of constraints on the project and of how the 
activities listed in the model really work, and criticising and 
revising the model. If the process model is used to gener-
ate a schedule manually (rather than picking from a set of 
simulated schedules) planning and scheduling can be seen 
as a forward chaining process of make-believe, where parts 
of the plan are treated as an artefact to be designed and thus 
open to debate and inferred using the principles of genera-
tion, then accepted as props or retracted.
As explained in Sect. 2, large organisations generate a 
multitude of process models and individuals reason about 
multiple models at once to make decisions. These can 
involve many of the different kinds of models outlined in 
Table 1. The artefacts used as props in planning can include 
generic process models for development methodologies and 
company standard processes, and process models for previ-
ous projects, that constrain and provide elements of plans for 
the current project. They thus serve different roles from (pro-
visional) plans for the current project, and are used accord-
ing to different rules for how to explore the consequences 
they have for the current project.
Plans for development projects need to balance and com-
bine the needs and priorities of designers with different 
responsibilities and expertise, and much project planning 
is done interactively in meetings. When a process model 
functions as a boundary object to communicate information 
between people with different interests and knowledge, it 
gives them a shared prop to constrain their envisioning of 
the implications of decisions for their own concerns. Thus 
they can infer propositions that they can agree are implied 
by the model (in Waltonian terms, fictional within the game 
defined by the model). For example, when different teams 
estimate potential finishing times for their own tasks they 
can start discussing how to coordinate them.
As planning is in practice rarely done by a single per-
son in a coherent fashion, the multiple models or combina-
tions of models afford different interpretations, which can 
be seen as contradictory fictional propositions. This poses a 
potential problem in design processes, as multiple legitimate 
interpretations can lead to problems. In the Waltonian view, 
fictional propositions are derived based on the props and 
the world knowledge which the players bring to the props, 
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thus allowing for multiple interpretations. In a similar way, 
the engineering process models are interpreted based on the 
knowledge of the individuals and the activities that have 
already taken place, and are subject to uncertainties like 
changes in requirements, resources, timing of activities, etc. 
(see de Weck et al. 2007 for a classification of uncertainty). 
However, they are also influenced by the perspectives indi-
viduals take on models.
Crucial for a successful project is a sufficient shared 
understanding of the rules for envisioning implications and 
changes. This involves understanding the syntax of the dia-
grams and the requirements for what needs to be included 
in adequate models, as well as the props that carry the infor-
mation used in a particular planning activity. By possessing 
specialist knowledge, different participants get to be custodi-
ans of different subsets of the rules of the imagination game 
played by the whole team. From an individual perspective, 
the participants are playing different games of make-believe 
with different principles and sometimes different props; from 
a group perspective, they are responsible for contributing 
different inferences from the props to a collective game.
5.5  Scenarios of interactions with process models
A view of engineering as a network of games of make-
believe, governed by different principles of generation of 
inferences as well as different props and different goals, sug-
gests that the participants in the imagination games in design 
processes can find themselves in different situations in which 
different principles of generation are appropriate. This gives 
them a different perspective on how they interpret models 
based on the role that they assume.
The following factors that characterise different kinds of 
situations will be used in Sect. 6 to identify situations in 
which different attitudes and perspectives that people can 
have on process models, i.e., on the props in the game, are 
appropriate:
• Process perspective versus Output perspective One 
important difference in perspective is between how a 
process will work, what needs to be done, and what will 
happen; and what a process or part of it will deliver. 
While this appears related to the view from inside or 
from outside the process, the correspondence is far from 
exact: people not directly involved in designing may have 
reasons to care about how the process unfolds; more sig-
nificantly, designers are both producers of information 
for others and consumers of information they need from 
their colleagues. For imagination games using process 
models as props, this is primarily an issue of what aspects 
of the props are important. It is the difference between 
looking at how the principles of generation establish fic-
tional truths to create a fictional state of affairs, and being 
concerned with using or establishing specific statements 
about the fictional word.
• Creator versus Recipient How one uses a process model 
to envisage what will happen in a part of a process cru-
cially depends on whether one is responsible for carrying 
out an activity and producing particular results, thus the 
creator of some kind of information artefact; or one is the 
recipient of the information artefact, not responsible for it 
but dependent on getting it on time and done sufficiently 
well. To extend our analogy of actors co-creating the 
fictional world of a play, this is the difference between an 
actor needing to flesh out a part beyond what is given by 
the text in order to play it convincingly to deliver on the 
author’s intentions, versus an actor needing other actors’ 
characterizations to work off. (When the recipients are 
outside the design process, their role is analogous to the 
audience participating in the game of understanding the 
fictional world co-created by author, director and actors.)
• Enfranchised versus Excluded Are the source of a pro-
cess model or a decision or a constraint, and the user of 
the model or other information both part of the decision-
making process? Or is this communication across the 
boundary of the team responsible for planning or model-
ling the process? In large-scale design processes, many 
of the participants are responsible for implementing the 
plan but not creating it—a matter of role rather than sen-
iority (for instance, as observed by Eckert and Clarkson 
2010). There are degrees of outsideness here according to 
how much contact and influence on the process planning 
the participants have; they may have influence on some 
parts of the process plan and not others. Also, many of 
the users of design process models are stakeholders with 
reasons to care about what the models are telling them 
but are not directly involved in designing, and thus do not 
participate in either creating or following process plans. 
Here, we are considering participants in the process, but 
the influence of exclusion from process decision-making 
on the rules of the imagination games seems very simi-
lar for external stakeholders. Conversely, participants in 
design process modelling make use of process-model-rel-
evant information from outside the process that they and 
their colleagues within the process can not directly influ-
ence. This corresponds to the ability to change the rules 
and reinterpret the props and needing to stick to given 
rules. Thinking of a play as a game of make-believe, this 
is the difference between the directors and actors who put 
on the play and make decisions about how to interpret or 
even alter the text, and the audience who play the game 
of make-believe but do not share in defining it.
• Negotiation versus Diktat Is the design process model 
or other information provisional or flexible or open to 
negotiation? Or is it fixed because it has been decided 
upon or is inherently unalterable? This is equivalent to 
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the fixedness of the game. Again thinking of this in terms 
of a play, this is the difference between whether the direc-
tor and the actors are allowed to change the words or have 
to stick as faithfully as possible to the original script.
• Transparent versus Opaque Can the user of the model or 
other information see and appreciate the reasons behind 
a decision, or why the implications of the model are what 
they are claimed to be, or why other information is as it 
is? Or does this need to be taken on trust or obedience? 
This corresponds to how apparent the principles of gen-
eration are to the readers of books. Some novels depend 
on principles of generation that the author assumes the 
reader to know. Many science fiction stories or novels 
deliberately make events seem very strange to the reader 
who must take on trust the existence of a rational expla-
nation that will eventually be revealed.
In the next section we discuss ways to conceptualise 
process models and the activities that they are used in that 
fit different combinations of these characteristics. How-
ever, we do not think this is an exhaustive list of useful 
conceptualizations.
5.6  Conclusion: agreeing principles of generation
In a game of make-believe, players assume roles which affect 
the actions that they carry out. Players of games have goals 
they want to achieve, and different attitudes to current and 
potential states of affairs. Thinking of designing as a game 
of make-believe with models as props highlights the fact that 
multiple way of playing the game can be equally legitimate 
based on the same ‘fictional’ propositions derived from the 
models.
This shows that different interpretations of the implica-
tion of models, in particular the combination of multiple 
models, are an inherent part of interacting with models. It is 
not the result of lack of modelling ability by the creator of 
models or lack of understanding of the user, but an inherent 
part of designing. In practice, figures of authority in design 
processes, bosses or managers, can provide an interpretation 
of the process models. However, they and the designers need 
to be aware that a different interpretation is possible and 
therefore an authoritative interpretation is required.
It is important that people thinking about the design 
process, or talking about it or making decisions based on 
it, agree on what the rules of the game are or are follow-
ing rules that their colleagues recognise and understand. 
For example, a group needs to agree on the features that a 
functional prototype needs to have to pass a particular gate-
way and on the activities arising from that. Process models 
help teams to agree on what the various subgames are that 
make up the design process by guiding the specification of 
activities with particular goals or recording decisions about 
them.
There are two sides to agreeing principles of generation 
for using a model to reason about a design process. One is 
understanding what the model itself is saying—thus how the 
prop constrains and guides the imagination game. For exam-
ple, whether the main function of a process model is to indi-
cate dependency or the order in which tasks are carried out. 
For another example, whether in a particular organisation 
one should submit incomplete information on time to give an 
indication of progress or whether one should wait until the 
task is finished. While this kind of context is often commu-
nicated orally, misunderstanding can lead to decisions being 
based on unfinished and unconfirmed information.
The other side is understanding what principles should 
govern the imagination game through which people draw 
inferences about the design process from the model. What 
the user thinks the model means depends on what the user 
thinks the model is.
6  Conceptualizations of design process 
models
What different kinds of meanings can design process models 
have for their users? In other words, what different kinds 
of rules might the model users need to follow in thinking 
about the relationship between the model and the process, 
and what the user should do in response to the model? In this 
section, we look at how different ways to conceptualise what 
process models are fit different situations and attitudes to the 
models, and how they help to form different sets of rules for 
how to think about models and processes. The set of concep-
tualizations we present are not an exhaustive classification, 
and we have only considered the use of models in planning 
and carrying out current and future processes; however they 
cover a range of situations that are important in industrial 
practice. The creators of the models and other stakeholders 
can actively influence how the models are interpreted but 
only if they realise they need to do this.
Here Walton’s approach does not help any further as he 
does not detail how the games of make-believe actually work 
or what unites different games of make-believe. To under-
stand this, we draw on another philosophical theory: speech 
act theory, which explains how utterances lead to actions in 
different contexts. One of the fundamental divisions between 
these situations lies between seeing process in terms of out-
puts to be produced at particular times, or in terms of how 
the process proceeds (see Sect. 5.5). In Sect. 6.2, we discuss 
situations and conceptualizations fitting an output perspec-
tive; and in Sect. 6.3 we discuss situations and conceptual-
izations fitting a process perspective.
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6.1  Speech act theory
Speech act theory (Austin 1962; Searle 1969) looks at how 
utterances convey meaning to their recipients. According to 
speech act theory, an utterance does not just comprise the 
content of its sentences (its locution), but also the meaning it 
is intended to have in context, that is, how it should influence 
the hearer’s beliefs and intentions (its illocution). The mean-
ing it actually conveys to a hearer is termed its perlocution.
The illocution of an utterance includes what sort of an 
utterance it is, such as requesting, stating, proposing, prom-
ising or warning. The illocution also includes the speaker’s 
attitude to the content, such as expressing belief, doubt, 
ironic distance and so on. For instance, designers working 
in groups use rhetorical devices to modulate degree of com-
mitment to design proposals (Minneman 1991; Brereton 
et al. 1996).
Process models, as well as information about the con-
straints on the process and the implications the process mod-
els have, are frequently referred to in communication acts. 
These communication acts convey attitudes to the models 
as well as explicitly including them or dismissing them as 
relevant to the current activity and highlighting particular 
features. And we can also think of individuals’ private inter-
actions with models as communication acts with themselves 
that include their attitudes to the models. Our argument here 
is that these attitudes help determine the principles people 
apply—or should apply—to draw the appropriate inferences 
from models.
The attitudes that designers and other stakeholders can 
have and express towards models is tightly connected to 
what they think the models are—that is, how they concep-
tualise them.
6.2  Output perspective: models mapping results
Within an output perspective—a focus on what the process 
or part of it needs to produce—situations differ according 
to how fixed the process and the information artefacts it 
requires are, and according to whether the requirements for 
particular information artefacts at particular times are seen 
from the perspective of the producer or user (see Fig. 2).
As we have noted, many process models make explicit 
the need to produce results at particular points in the pro-
cess. Producing the results gets to be the responsibility of 
individuals or teams, who have deadlines. How the parts of 
a process model stating these responsibilities are conceptual-
ised is a matter of perspective. Process models—or portions 
of them—with these different statuses function as props in 
imagination games in different ways according to the goals 
of the imagination games. Both creators and recipients need 
to reason about how to deliver on their own responsibili-
ties: for creators, the models serve to define goals; while 
for recipients, they serve to define constraints on what they 
can do.
6.2.1  Models as promises
When part of a process model specifies a result, such as 
part of a design or some test results, that an individual or a 
team or the company undertakes to deliver, it can be seen 
from the perspective of the recipients of the information to 
be produced as a statement of a promise. They need to think 
about whether they can trust the promise and what to do if 
it is not met, in envisaging how their part of the process will 
work according to the model.
6.2.2  Models as demands
Conversely, when part of a process model specifies a result 
to be delivered, it can be seen by the creators—the individ-
ual or team charged with producing it—as a demand. They 
need to think about how to elaborate their part of the process 
specified by the model to produce the required result.
6.2.3  Models as proposals
When what is to be delivered and when is not fixed but sub-
ject to negotiation, so the model is not settled, what is to be 
delivered and when is a proposal from the perspective of 
what the individual or team that would be the recipient of 
the suggested output from a part of the process they are not 
responsible for.
6.2.4  Models as requests
Conversely, when what is to be delivered and when is not 
fixed, what is to be delivered and when is a request from the 
perspective of what might be asked of an individual or team.
Proposal 
Recipient
Creator
Negoaon 
Diktat
Demand
Request
Promise 
Output Perspecve
Fig. 2  Conceptualizations of process models, seen from an output 
perspective
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The difference between promises and demands, on the 
one hand, and proposals and requests, on the other is a mat-
ter of both position in the organisation and of time.
6.3  Process perspective: Models mapping activities
Within a process perspective—looking at a design process 
model in terms of what the activities are and how they are 
connected—situations differ according to whether the user 
of the model is involved with making decisions about the 
process—enfranchised—or excluded from it; whether the 
process model is open to negotiation or fixed—a diktat; and 
whether the reasoning behind why the process model is as it 
is is transparent or opaque. Two positions on three dimen-
sions give us eight types of situations with different char-
acteristics calling for different attitudes to process models 
(see Fig. 3). Here we describe conceptualizations of process 
models that fit each of them, without claiming this is a com-
plete list of possible views of process models.
6.3.1  Models as frames
In the activity of constructing a process model, the new 
model itself, previous or generic models being adapted, 
and the model element types prescribed by the modelling 
formalism, function as a frame—a structure that specifies 
categories of things that will be present in the situation 
and the relationships between them (cf. Schank and Abel-
son 1977). The frame provides a way to fit the process into 
slots: to divide up the messiness of a design process into 
named activities, that belong to particular categories and are 
clustered and sequenced into particular groups, and define 
what sorts of information the activities need and produce. 
This serves to reduce the complexity of what needs to be 
thought about, by imposing one prespecified structure on 
something that could be conceptualised and divided up in 
different ways. However, employing a modelling formalism 
as a frame is a two-way process of seeing how the categories 
in the model make sense of elements of the process, and 
how well what needs to be done and the requirements and 
constraints on the process fit the categories and sequences. 
When models are used for planning, this has direct conse-
quences for how later participants in the process will under-
stand it, and how it will be carried out.
In the imagination game of constructing a model using 
methodological expectations and a modelling formalism 
to identify and characterise activities and outputs that will 
need to be there, and envisioning how the process will work 
according to the model, the boundaries can blur between 
props—artefacts that are given—and principles—the knowl-
edge people use to interpret the props—and artefacts pro-
duced in the activity.
Note that in this discussion, we argue that the process 
model acts as a frame for understanding the process. How-
ever, the modelling technique acts as a frame for the process 
model. For example, DSMs treat processes as sequences of 
tasks, whereas flowchart style models make decisions and 
alternative paths explicit. Using a process modelling for-
malism as a frame involves participants in the modelling 
making decisions for visible reasons about how the process 
model should fit the process, and negotiation both between 
participants in the modelling and between the model and the 
actual or putative process itself.
6.3.2  Models as pathways
When a design process plan is being implemented, the 
models describing the plan and possibly other models are 
conceptualised by the participants as a pathway: a route to 
follow with milestones to reach and actions to perform at 
different places, as well as information and physical artefacts 
provided by others to be found and problems of particular 
kinds to be resolved at particular locations. In these situ-
ations, the actors are participants in the process who see 
the decisions embodied in the model as having transparent 
rational justifications, or at least accept them as justified, and 
who take the process model as given as a guide to action. 
The task of the imagination game is to work out, from the 
model and the detailed information about the state of the 
design, what to do to reach the next step.
6.3.3  Models as proclamations
Decisions about processes embodied in process models 
where the rationales for the decisions are opaque can func-
tion like proclamations by an absolutist ruler in situations 
where the people affected by them cannot point out problems 
and argue for their own concerns. While it is necessary to 
make decisions to carry out design processes, management 
decisions made without consultation and consideration of 
Prediction
Projection
Excluded
Enfranchised
Negoaon
Diktat
Transparent
Opaque 
Proclamation 
Position
Pathway
Frame
Prophecy 
Proposition
Process Perspecve
Fig. 3  Conceptualizations of process models, seen from a process 
perspective. The negotiation-diktat dimension is indicated by the 
shading
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positions are demotivating; they are often unavoidable but 
the necessity needs to be justified. In very complex pro-
cesses, there is inevitably an element of proclamation, 
because not all participants can be consulted and rationales 
cannot be given in a succinct enough way that people can 
engage with them. For example, projects often have to work 
around free slots on testing rigs, which might not be avail-
able at ideal times; similarly experts might only be available 
from a certain point. Thus some statements about processes, 
perhaps encapsulated in models, can function as fixed points 
to be reasoned from but not reasoned about, in the game of 
envisaging how the project will play out.
Models or process constraints embodying seemingly arbi-
trary decisions are seen as needing to be fought or worked 
around in ways that are likely to be detrimental to a smooth 
running project. In extreme cases, they create imagination 
games where the goal is to find ways to mitigate the con-
sequences of the arbitrary decisions about part of the plan, 
and achieve goals that are not part of the official plan, thus 
to create an unofficial plan in opposition to the official plan.
6.3.4  Models as positions
In situations where process planning is subject to discussion 
between interested parties, models or elements of models, as 
well as requirements and constraints, may be put forward by 
the participants. These may have rationales that appear clear 
to their proposers but appear opaque or overstated or insuf-
ficiently well justified to others. These others may push for 
other priorities or need to ensure that the proposals are com-
patible with their own concerns. The models may thus serve 
as positions in negotiations to be accepted, rejected, clari-
fied, elaborated and so on. These negotiations involve the 
imagination game of envisaging what follows from a model, 
assessing advantages, disadvantages and costs, envisaging 
what would follow from variations of the model, assessing 
what is and is not acceptable, and gauging degrees of need 
for changes in the model.
For example, design managers often request time esti-
mates from their team members for particular tasks. These 
are often accompanied by informal process models, to justify 
the times and steps assigned to them. The team members 
take these positions as a starting point and negotiate a plan 
that works for all.
This is particularly an issue when working across a supply 
chain, for example when selecting between suppliers with 
alternative processes.
6.3.5  Models as propositions
Process models look different to people who are outside the 
process, so neither involved in planning the process nor in 
implementing it. Other stakeholders within the organisation 
or in other companies need to make use of models of design 
processes and information derived from them for their own 
planning and decision-making. Sometimes the model can 
function as a proposition: the actor is outside the decision-
making process and so cannot alter the model, and  the 
rationales behind the decisions it embodies are opaque, but 
the model and its consequences constitute an offer that can 
be accepted or rejected. Again, this might be the case when 
working with powerful suppliers, who leave the company 
no choice but to take an offer. Deciding about a proposition 
again involves the imagination game of envisaging what fol-
lows from a model, and assessing advantages, disadvantages 
and costs; but the next step is assessing whether these are 
acceptable in the absence of alternatives.
6.3.6  Models as predictions
In cases where people within the design process or outside 
it are affected by what will happen and depend on under-
standing the consequences of how the process will unfold, 
the process model functions as a prediction. The task of 
the imagination game is using the process model to envi-
sion how the expected behaviour of the process—rationally 
understood but not to be influenced—will affect their own 
concerns. The predictive nature of modelling plays a very 
important role in time and resource planning.
In science, predictions are often made based on the under-
standing of the causal relations in the target system leading 
to the predicted event. These relations may be deterministic 
or probabilistic, yielding deterministic or probabilistic pre-
dictions, respectively. In other cases, scientific predictions 
are based on correlations. In science the interest is largely 
in the output of processes. In design outputs are described/
defined by product models, and process models are used to 
describe the process by which this output is created. We have 
analysed this relationship in Eckert and Hillerbrand (2018). 
In sciences such as physics or chemistry, the predictions 
usually do not affect the event itself. However, in systems 
that depend on human behaviour, predictions can have an 
influence on the behaviour of the human agents and therefore 
on the outcome. For example economic predictions influ-
ence human behaviour and thereby the outcome; climate 
change prediction might affect policy making which in turn 
might affect behaviour. However, these models do usually 
not include predictions about how they affect the outcome 
and do not prescribe how the outcome is generated. Process 
models do just that: they prescribe and influence the process.
6.3.7  Models as projections
In climate science, a distinction is often made between pre-
dictions and projections, that is directly applicable to under-
standing the import of design process models. A prediction 
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describes what will happen according to the model, and how 
likely the anticipated outcomes are. By contrast, projections, 
for instance of future states of the world in climate science, 
include an element of fiction, by applying the model to con-
jectured scenarios. According to Poznic and Hillerbrand 
(2017), the correct epistemological attitude to a prediction 
is belief (conditional on confidence in the model), whereas 
the correct epistemological attitude to a projection is make-
belief (conditional on the acceptance of the scenario, as well 
as the model).
Design process models may be based on scenarios for what 
might happen. In some cases they may be parameterized in 
some way, often in terms of time or resources, so that alterna-
tive events or choices can be plugged in. They thus yield (or 
become) projections that depend on accepting the scenarios. 
For example, alternative scenarios may need to be considered 
for what would happen if the project misses test rig slots, or 
fails to get components from suppliers on time, or the design 
fails to hit performance targets. People outside the project are 
enabled to see what would be the consequences for their inter-
ests in different scenarios, and to form preferences. Projections 
are particularly important when companies need to plan based 
on assumptions about whether or not they obtain particular 
orders.
6.3.8  Models as prophecies
What happens in a design process is contingent on both the 
models and the events that unfold in the process. The process 
model provides a guide to what is to come but how it does so 
and how far it should be trusted may be obscure to outsiders 
who depend on what they are told for their own work.
What happens according to a process model depends on 
other elements being true and on the explicit or implicit logi-
cal connections between them. However in actual design pro-
cesses, unlike in logical contingency, not all the factors that 
are important are known, nor are the causal relationships fully 
understood; and what becomes important depends very much 
on circumstances. This brings us to our last conceptualiza-
tion of design process models—prophecy. The design pro-
cess model foretells how the design process will unfold and 
what its consequences will be, but when its justifications and 
internal workings are obscure it needs to be taken on trust and 
believed through faith in the knowledge and competence of 
its originators.
Prophecy is largely a religious concept, which assumes that 
a prophet receives a divine insight into events that will hap-
pen in the future. Some prophets have revealed an inexorable 
doom, while others have issued warnings about choices the 
hearers can still make. (Prophecies have posed many questions 
about the free will of the agents that the prophecies are about, 
discussed by philosophers through the ages.) This is an oddly 
appropriate metaphor for design processes as the designers do 
control the process to a large extent, but are bound by exter-
nal conditions that they can not be fully aware of and by the 
laws of nature. Prophecies differ conceptually from predictions 
in that predictions gain credence from fallible but traceable 
human reasoning from evidence, while prophecies gain cre-
dence from faith in authority—in design, the authority of the 
manager or the methodology.
7  Discussion: types of model and types 
of interpretation
We discuss twelve possible conceptualizations, as sum-
marised in Fig. 4. Following basic ideas from speech act 
theory, we have argued that the attitudes to process models 
people take in thinking about and discussing processes 
are crucial, but the attitudes that people can take towards 
process models depend on what they think the process 
models are.
This classification of models cuts across the classifica-
tion of models by Wynn and Clarkson (2017), which is 
presented in Table 1, since it addresses the implicit and 
perceived status of the information the models convey and 
the roles the models play in decision-making and coordi-
nating design processes, rather than their intended infor-
mation content or their level of detail or the type of activi-
ties the models are intended to be used in. The issues we 
consider in this paper are the subject of tacit assumptions 
in most process modelling research. The models reviewed 
by Wynn and Clarkson largely assume a process perspec-
tive—they guide thinking about processes as sets of activi-
ties. How specific models fall under different categories 
varies with the individual models; however some general 
trends might be seen. Procedural models are transparent at 
least by intention; whether the user is involved in imple-
menting the procedures determines whether they function 
as pathways or proclamations—“we will do it this way”—
or as projections or predictions—“this is what is going 
to happen”. Abstract models often function as frames for 
conceptualising the elements of processes and how they 
are connected together.” Analysis and MS/OR models are 
intended to generate projections and predictions, but can 
in practice be opaque and be seen as prophecies. Both 
descriptive and prescriptive models aim to be transparent. 
Prescriptive models by their nature are diktats, so that they 
can be seen as predictions or pathways; however some 
development methods explicitly allow for customization 
to meet the needs of particular projects. Descriptive mod-
els are usually constructed through discussion with the 
participants. As descriptive models look backwards rather 
than forwards, how they can be interpreted depends on the 
use to which descriptive models are put.
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Similarly this classification is also orthogonal to that 
of Browning and Ramasesh (2007), which covered most 
of the well-known process modelling frameworks, such as 
DSMs (Browning 2001) and Applied Signposting (Wynn 
2007). These modelling frameworks do not determine 
how designers use the models or how they communicate 
through them. However, most modelling frameworks share 
the common goal of making processes more transparent. 
They also aim to pull information together that otherwise 
would be held in several unconnected models. Software 
engineering methodologies such as the Unified Process 
(Jacobson et al. 1999), SSADM (see for instance Good-
land with Slater 1995) and OPM (Dori 2002) explicitly 
link product documentation to process steps. This reduces 
the space of alternative interpretations that are compatible 
with the models. By analogy, they are the model equiva-
lent of books with better drawn characters and more com-
plete world descriptions, that the readers might enjoy more 
and create fan communities around.
For the designers in Eckert and Clarkson’s (2010) auto-
motive industry study, the multiple process models largely 
felt like something from which they were excluded and 
which was opaque to them. The designers created their own 
models which they understood and saw largely as requests, 
i.e., something that helped others to understand what was 
required from them and which they were willing to discuss. 
They did not see most of the models generated by others as 
proposals, but as demands that they had to comply with. 
Through the combination of models that they understood 
and could influence to varying extents overall the design-
ers felt excluded; and experienced the landscape of different 
models as opaque and as a diktat. Which make the models 
collectively a form of prophecy.
8  Conclusion: lenses for looking at process 
models
The analysis presented in this paper has different implica-
tions for each of its intended audiences, who will find dif-
ferent aspects of what we have to say new and informative, 
or familiar and obvious. For engineering designers and 
managers, we aim to offer some insight into problems with 
communicating about design processes and ways to discuss 
what process models mean. For academic design research-
ers, we put forward a conceptual framework for analysing 
communication about design processes with and through 
models, and a different and complementary perspective on 
Fig. 4  Twelve conceptualiza-
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the very wide range of design process models put forward 
by researchers and working engineers. For philosophers of 
science, the paper offers a contribution to the ongoing pro-
ject of understanding what models are and what they do, and 
how they relate to their targets, which needs to encompass 
models in design as well as models in science.
In this paper, we have argued that analysing how design-
ers, design managers and other stakeholders make sense of 
what process models are and what they can do with them 
is important for understanding design planning and under-
standing what happens in development projects. Process 
models are used in different ways for different purposes 
by different people at different stages in the development 
process. The same process model can be used for differ-
ent purposes and seen in different ways, and designers 
can switch between them fluidly. Moreover, many process 
models are generated before the process unfolds. Therefore 
the relationship between a process model and its target 
system is far from uncomplicated. Hence, any statement 
of the form ‘a design process model is an X’ is likely to 
be wrong.
Our work has been motivated by the question “How can 
the process models function to coordinate and manage dif-
ferent groups and individuals when the plans are so fluid and 
unreliable?” We argue here that looking at designing as a 
network of rule-governed imagination games provides a use-
ful lens for making sense of what designers, managers and 
other stakeholders do with design process models. Draw-
ing on ideas in philosophy of science (notably from Frigg 
2010a, b, c; Toon 2010a, b, 2012) which themselves drew 
on Kendall Walton’s (1990) work in philosophy of literature, 
we see a model as a prop, akin to a book, that governs what 
people are allowed to imagine in a game of make-believe, in 
which they envisage the implications of the model. Agree-
ing on what the props are and on the rules of the game ena-
bles multiple stakeholders to draw the same inferences and 
decide what are valid assertions and reasonable expectations 
given those rules. What the rules of the game are depends on 
the relationship between the model and its target. We have 
argued here that design process models can have a variety 
of different relationships to past or future design processes, 
and that the models appear different to people depending on 
the situations that they find themselves in. Creators of the 
models see them differently from outsiders. We have argued 
that people can have a number of different conceptualization 
of process models depending on their situations.
Figure 4 provides a new classification of ways of think-
ing about process models to answer the question “How can 
process models be conceptualised to allow for the different 
roles that they play?” This is not an exhaustive classifica-
tion, and we have only considered the use of process mod-
els in planning and carrying out current or future design 
processes; however it covers a lot of situations that are 
important in industrial practice. Our argument is that the 
conceptualizations we have presented are what people see 
design process models as being, not what design process 
models are like. Thus they are not metaphors. However, 
our set of conceptualizations could be used as consciously 
articulated metaphors for conveying their intended status. 
We therefore conclude that each process model affords a 
range of legitimate characterizations and therefore affords 
different interpretations of the implications of its content. 
These need to be actively managed to avoid misunderstand-
ings. The implication is that designers and design managers 
need to put effort into helping their colleagues to interpret 
the models in the intended way.
In future work, we would like to investigate in more 
detail the implications of the different conceptualizations 
in terms of how process models help with envisaging the 
future. In presenting a set of alternative conceptualizations 
of design process models, we have drawn on work in phi-
losophy of science on the role of models in forecasting cli-
mate change (Poznic and Hillerbrand 2017) to make distinc-
tions between predictions and projections. A prediction is 
a rationally grounded calculation of what is most likely to 
happen according to the model; a projection has an element 
of fiction in that it is a calculation of what is most likely to 
happen given both the model and a conjectured scenario. 
However, process models frequently function as prophecies. 
They foretell the future, but why the model says what it says 
is obscure to the user, who must rely on trust in the author-
ity and higher knowledge of the prophet or the prophet’s 
sources of wisdom.
Processes are not gods, but through process models, plans 
and tacit expectations they direct and control behaviour. 
Although design processes are social constructs seen differ-
ently by the different participants (cf Checkland 1981), they 
structure how the participants think of what they are doing, 
creating shared assumptions that certain events will occur. 
While they afford freedom for the designers in carrying out 
the activities they demand, they can also be inescapable.
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